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THIN SHIELDS PIERCE EASILY: A CASE FOR 
FORTIFYING THE JOURNALISTS’ PRIVILEGE IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
Devin M. Smith† 
Abstract:  In late 2006, New Zealand’s Parliament inserted Section 68 into the 
nation’s Evidence Act 2006, providing for the first time a testimonial privilege 
specifically protecting journalists from compelled disclosure of their confidential sources.  
The privilege, commonly referred to as a shield law, has been met with approval from 
politicians, media commentators, and journalists, both in New Zealand and beyond. 
While New Zealand’s reporter shield law goes a long way toward extending press 
freedoms, it ultimately falls short of the country’s historically robust commitment to the 
free flow of information.  Section 68’s most glaring shortcoming is the ease with which a 
judge can tear down its protections.  A judicial determination that the public interest in 
the disclosure of the source outweighs the public interest in maintaining confidentiality 
will pierce the shield.  Unfortunately, balancing tests such as the one codified in Section 
68 have a track record of exploitation, often with fair trial concerns overriding free 
expression. 
In that light, Section 68 should be strengthened for three purposes:  1) to reflect the 
nation’s longstanding commitment to a free and vibrant media, 2) to satisfy the 
requirements of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and 3) to accord with effective 
models from other democratic governments.  Two relevant sources the country could 
mine for guidance include United States federal law and the newly enacted shield law in 
Washington State.  New Zealand would be well served by observing not only the 
protective innovations of the two models, but also their shortcomings.  The federal status 
quo in the U.S., should serve as a cautionary tale, both from policy and legal standpoints.  
Washington State’s statute on the other hand, strikes an appropriate balance between the 
public interest in disclosure and the public interest in protecting journalists’ sources. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 5, 1999, the front page of New Zealand’s Sunday  
Star-Times served readers a juicy political scandal.1  In part delicious, in part 
tragic, the scandal involved New Zealand Police Commissioner Peter 
Doone’s conduct during a routine traffic stop.  After playing in the press for 
more than a month, the incident gained momentum on January 16, 2000, 
when a confidential government source implicated Doone in obstructing a 
                                                      
†
 J.D. expected 2009, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
Peter Nicolas, the Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law at the University of Washington, for his 
guidance.  Also, this comment would not have been possible without the incessant nitpicking of the Pacific 
Rim Law & Policy Journal’s editorial staff.  Thank you too, Robin, for your support, patience, and good 
humor. 
1
 Police Boss Was in Car Stopped by Constables, THE SUNDAY STAR-TIMES (Auckland), Dec. 5, 
1999, at 1. 
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breathalyzer test intended for the driver, Doone’s then-girlfriend.2  Despite 
staunchly denying wrongdoing, Doone resigned shortly thereafter.3 
The imbroglio started on election night, November 27, 1999.  Just 
after nine o’clock, a rookie constable pulled over a 1999 Nissan Maxima 
driven by Robyn Johnstone4 for operating without activated headlights. 5  
The police commissioner sat in the front passenger seat. 6   Quoting an 
unidentified source, the Sunday Star-Times alleged that Doone exited the car 
and engaged rookie constable Brett Main as the constable approached the 
Maxima.7  Main had been on the job three days.8  The article quoted Doone 
as uttering four fateful words:  “That won’t be necessary,” when the rookie 
indicated he should perform a breathalyzer test on Johnstone.9  Although the 
rookie cop had the “alcohol sniffer” in hand, he never administered the 
test.10 
On January 14, 2000, Sunday Star-Times reporter Oskar Alley 
telephoned New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark to inquire about the 
incident (he had initially learned of it from police sources).11  The Prime 
Minister confirmed, under a presumption of confidentiality,12 that Doone 
used the infamous four words. 13   The high-level, yet anonymous, 14 
confirmation assured the scoop a prominent front-page splash on January 16, 
2000.15 
As a result of the ensuing public outcry, Doone was forced to resign 
later that month.16   Police reports criticized Doone for approaching the 
                                                      
2
  Oskar Alley, Doone Case Cop Was Ready to Breath Test, THE SUNDAY STAR-TIMES (Auckland), 
Jan. 16, 2000, at 1. 
3
  Vernon Small, Unrepentant Doone Forced to Step Down, THE N.Z. HERALD, Jan. 26, 2000, 
available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=114200. 
4
  Johntone, who was Doone’s girlfriend at the time, is now his wife.  See Leah Haines, Doones: 
Why We’re Taking on Helen Clark, THE N.Z. HERALD, May 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10123168. 
5
  Helen Tunnah, PM to Fight Defamation Claim, THE N.Z. HERALD, Apr. 28, 2005, available at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/litigation/news/article.cfm?c_id=249&objectid=10122718. 
6
  Alley, supra note 2. 
7
  Id. 
8
  Tunnah, supra note 5. 
9
  Alley, supra note 2. 
10
 Haines, supra note 4. 
11
 Press Release, ACT political party, Did Prime Minister Helen Clark Treat Police Commissioner 
Peter Doone with Honesty and Integrity? (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.act.org.nz/node/26929#. 
12
  Editorial, Doone Affair Puts All in a Poor Light, THE N.Z. HERALD, May 4, 2005, available at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=240&objectid=10123643. 
13
  Id. 
14
  The article referred to Prime Minister Clark as a “source” and a “source close to the inquiry.”  
Alley, supra note 2. 
15
  Id. 
16
  Small, supra note 3. 
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officer, but also found that Doone never used the phrase “that won’t be 
necessary.”17 
Five years passed before Doone sued the Sunday Star-Times for 
defamation, claiming $850,000 (NZD) in damages.18  During the legal battle 
between Doone and the newspaper, court documents filed by Clark 19 
revealed that the Prime Minister had served as the confidential source of the 
newspaper’s information.20   On April 27, 2005, Doone dropped his suit 
against the Sunday Star-Times and set his legal energies against the Prime 
Minister.21 
While New Zealand legislators had been contemplating a journalists’ 
privilege for more than a decade,22 few could have guessed a routine traffic 
stop would become the catalyst for codifying one.  The outing of the Prime 
Minister as the source of the Sunday Star-Times’ story humiliated Prime 
Minister Clark and her government.23  The ensuing uproar, fueled by the 
Prime Minister’s comments that government officials would curtail 
conversations with reporters if their identities could not be protected,24 gave 
momentum to a reporter shield law.25   Accordingly, Parliament inserted 
Section 68 (hereinafter “§ 68”) into the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006, 
providing a qualified privilege for journalists to maintain the confidentiality 
of their sources.26 
This comment examines the scope of protection provided by New 
Zealand’s journalists’ privilege.  Part II explores New Zealand’s historical 
                                                      
17
  An internal report conducted by then Deputy Police Commissioner Rob Robinson, Doone’s right-
hand man, called Doone’s actions “inappropriate.”  Tunnah, supra note 5.  The Sunday Star-Times printed a 
correction on June 4, 2000:  “The Sunday Star-Times, having recently received further information, now 
acknowledges that Peter Doone did not make that statement.  We regret our error and apologise to former 
commissioner Doone.”  Alley, supra note 2. 
18
  Kevin List, Fairfax Makes PM an Offer She Can’t Refuse: How the Prime Minister and APN 
Employees Came to be Defending Fairfax, SCOOP INDEPENDENT NEWS, May 10, 2005, 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0505/S00117.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2008). 
19
 Clark did not admit her involvement voluntarily.  The Sunday Star-Times’s publisher, Fairfax New 
Zealand, subpoeanaed Clark to provide a brief of evidence to help defend against Doone’s lawsuit.  Id.  See 
also Tunnah, supra note 5.  Fairfax was roundly criticized for breaching its journalistic and ethical duties to 
protect confidential sources.  Doone Affair Puts All in a Poor Light, supra note 12. 
20
  Tunnah, supra note 5. 
21
  Id. 
22
 New Zealand Law Commission, Preliminary Paper No. 23: Evidence Law: Privilege, May 1994, 
¶ 348. 
23
  Doone Affair Puts All in a Poor Light, supra note 12.  The opposition party even called on her to 
resign.  See 625 PARL. DEB., H.R. (May 10, 2005) 20360. 
24
  Doone Affair Puts All in a Poor Light, supra note 12. 
25
 See Media Law Update, Bell Gully, Journalists’ Sources—Protection in the Spotlight? (Aug. 
2005) (on file with Bell Gully), available at http://www.bellgully.co.nz/newsletters/01Media/ 
journalistic_protection.asp. 
26
  Helen Tunnah, Journalists Get Protection, THE N.Z. HERALD, May 28, 2005.  See Media Law 
Update, supra note 25. 
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commitment to the free flow of information to provide context for the 
passage of § 68.  Part III features an in-depth look at the strengths and 
weaknesses of § 68, including a comparison of § 68 to New Zealand 
common law confidential-source protections, Section 14 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, and general free-press ideals.  Part IV contrasts § 68 
with shield laws in other jurisdictions, including United States federal law 
and the new journalists’ privilege in Washington State.  Finally, Part V 
recommends specific changes to § 68 that would make it a robust, suitable, 
and effective shield law. 
II. NEW ZEALAND’S HISTORICAL COMMITMENT TO THE FREE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION IS ENERGETIC AND ESTABLISHED 
A. Protecting Reporter-Source Confidentiality Is Essential to a Vibrant 
and Effective Media and, by Extension, a Functional Democracy in 
New Zealand 
Confidential sources are key ingredients to an effective free press.  
Journalists cannot fulfill one of their primary purposes—the role of 
government watchdog—without cultivating and maintaining confidences.  In 
Goodwin v. United Kingdom,27 a case heard before the European Court of 
Human Rights in 1996, the court elucidated the need for confidential sources 
in free society: 
[F]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential 
foundations of a democratic society and . . . the safeguards to be 
afforded to the press are of particular importance.  Protection of 
journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press 
freedom . . . .  Without such protection, sources may be deterred 
from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of 
public interest. 28 
The deterrence described in Goodwin is of particular concern to journalists.  
Forced disclosure of confidential sources has a so-called chilling effect on 
the free flow of information.29  Specifically, compelled disclosure severs the 
media’s ability to acquire information, which, in turn, strangles a modern, 
informed, and democratic citizenry.  Many chilling-effect analyses proffer 
                                                      
27
  Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 (1996). 
28
  Id. at 143. 
29
  See Janice Brabyn, Protection against Judicially Compelled Disclosure of the Identity of News 
Gatherers’ Confidential Sources in Common Law Jurisdictions, 69(6) MO. L. REV. 895, 922 (Nov. 2006); 
see Goodwin, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 143; see also B.D. Gray, Journalists Compelled to be Witnesses—Time 
for a Re-Evaluation, 2006 N.Z. L. REV. 443, 444 (2006). 
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three concerns:  1) current or potential sources will dry up as a result of 
routine compelled disclosure; 2) journalists themselves will face increased 
personal harm through violence and intimidation if sources realize 
journalists can be compelled to testify as to events they observe.30  Said 
another way, if sources come to believe they have to cover up conversations 
they have had with reporters, they may resort to desperate measures; and  
3) compelled disclosure infringes upon the autonomy of media outlets to 
dictate their own news coverage.31 
Of the three prongs, the “drying up” of sources due to routine 
compelled disclosure has particularly troubling consequences to the free 
flow of information.  One commentator described the phenomenon as 
follows:  “[g]eneral or specific knowledge amongst potential sources that 
news gatherers can be compelled to disclose their identities in court . . . will 
have a strong chilling effect upon some people who might otherwise be 
willing or persuaded to be confidential sources in the future.”32 
As a case in point, after her involvement in the Doone affair, Prime 
Minister Clark expressed a disinclination to speak with journalists.  “There 
was a time when I used to pick up journalists’ phone calls; that time is 
largely now gone.  One does learn from those experiences,” Clark said.33  It 
would be hard to argue that the citizens of New Zealand are not adversely 
affected by their Prime Minister’s reluctance to speak to them via the press. 
In light of these considerations, many media commentators and media 
organizations argue the professional and ethical obligation to protect source 
confidentiality is sacrosanct.  The American Society of Newspaper Editors 
guidelines note that “[p]ledges of confidentiality to news sources must be 
honored at all costs . . . .”34  New Zealand press commentators have noted:  
“Journalists . . . have an obligation to protect [sources] when necessary.  The 
generally accepted practice is to refuse to identify the identity of a source,”35 
even if it leads to contempt of court.  The 1999 New Zealand Press Council’s 
Statement of Principles suggests that editors and journalists “have a strong 
obligation to protect against disclosure of the identity of confidential 
sources.”36  Perhaps due to the position taken by journalists, in 1994 the 
                                                      
30
 Gray, supra note 29, at 444. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Brabyn, supra note 29, at 922. 
33
  625 PARL. DEB., H.R. (May 10, 2005), 20361. 
34
  American Society of Newspaper Editors, ASNE Statement of Principles, Article VI, Nov. 29, 
2006, http://www.asne.org//index.cfm?ID=888 (last visited Sept. 10, 2008) (emphasis added). 
35
  John Tidey, Well-informed Sources, in WHAT’S NEWS: RECLAIMING JOURNALISM IN NEW 
ZEALAND 72, 78 (Judy McGregor & Margie Comrie eds., Dunmore Press 2002). 
36
  Jim Tully & Nadia Elsaka, Ethical Codes and Credibility: The Challenge to Industry, in WHAT’S 
NEWS: RECLAIMING JOURNALISM IN NEW ZEALAND 142, 154 (Judy McGregor & Margie Comrie eds., 
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New Zealand Law Commission concluded that a journalists’ privilege would 
serve “the wider interest of society better than if no privilege were 
accorded.”37 
From United States lore, the most celebrated confidential source is 
Deep Throat.  Now exposed to be former Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Associate Director W. Mark Felt,38 Deep Throat helped undo the presidency 
of Richard Nixon following a 1972 burglary at the Watergate complex.39  
“This is a case history and a case lesson of why it is so important that we 
have confidential sources,” said Carl Bernstein who, along with fellow 
Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, broke the Watergate story.  “If 
you were to look back at the original stories, I think hardly any of them had 
named sources.  There’s no way this reporting could have been done, nor is 
there any way that good reporting at a lot of places can be done, without 
anonymous sources.”40   Felt was willing to collaborate with Woodward 
because he felt confident the reporter would go to jail before revealing Felt 
as the source of information.41  In fact, Felt’s identity remained the best-kept 
secret in American journalism for more than three decades, until he divulged 
his own involvement in 2005.42 
In the Doone affair, it remains unclear whether Prime Minister Clark 
made an honest mistake, received bad information, or intentionally lied 
when she told the newspaper Doone intervened in the breath test.  Of those 
possibilities, the third would most complicate the argument in favor of a 
shield law.  Namely, some journalists suggest that when a confidential 
source knowingly provides false information to the media—often for 
character assassination or other self-serving purpose—the source’s lie 
destroys the pledge of nondisclosure. 
However, this comment operates under the principle that even in the 
case of intentional falsehood, the journalist and the courts should not divulge 
the source’s identity.  If New Zealand courts do not protect sources deemed 
to be liars, sources with legitimate, accurate, and important information 
might not step forward—this is the chilling effect.  Failure to protect 
                                                                                                                                                              
Dunmore Press 2002) (quoting the New Zealand Press Council, Statement of Principles, 1999.  The 2008 
principles are available at http://www.presscouncil.org.nz/principles_2.html). 
37
  New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 22, ¶ 334. 
38
  Todd S. Purdum, “Deep Throat” Unmasks Himself as Ex-No. 2 at F.B.I., THE N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 1, 
2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/01/politics/01throat.html?_r=sq. 
39
 Id. 
40
  Id. 
41
  See generally BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Simon & 
Schuster 1974); KATHARINE GRAHAM, PERSONAL HISTORY 472, 483 (Alfred A. Knopf 1997); BEN 
BRADLEE, A GOOD LIFE: NEWSPAPERING AND OTHER ADVENTURES 365 (Simon & Schuster 1995). 
42
 Purdum, supra note 38. 
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apparent liars would force sources to develop ironclad evidence to support 
their information, particularly in the case where an opposing side could be 
expected to voice vehement opposition, denials, or outright lies.  Often, 
sources cannot garner this type of evidence without risking personal or 
professional injury.  If courts put honest sources at the risk of being treated 
like unprotected liars, the honest sources will be less willing to contact 
journalists. 
One of America’s preeminent First Amendment lawyers, Floyd 
Abrams, recently said, 
[T]he law can’t and shouldn’t distinguish, and I would say 
journalists can’t and shouldn’t distinguish between good 
sources and bad, virtuous sources and unvirtuous ones.  If a 
journalist grants confidentiality, I think the journalist has to 
keep her word . . . .  [I]t seems to me very important for the 
credibility of all journalists and for the general free flow of 
information to come to the public for journalists who, having 
once promised confidentiality, keep their word about it.43  
Because journalists rarely witness important events firsthand, they must rely 
on sources for information.  Even the best journalistic instincts cannot 
always differentiate truth from falsity.  When a damning bit of confidential 
info comes across a journalist’s desk, corroboration by a second, trusted 
(hopefully on-the-record) source often provides a layer of trustworthiness.  
Unfortunately, “true” stories and “accurate” reports are not always the same.  
Sources often misspeak, exaggerate, or lie.  Journalists should strive for 
truth, but when truth proves elusive, the best journalists can do is accurately 
report the source’s information.  In this light, how can the law expect 
journalists to know who is lying and who is not?  Permitting disclosure for 
lying confidential sources puts journalists in the position of making that 
unknowable call. 
Instead, the only feasible solution is a shield law that includes 
protection even for potentially untruthful sources.  When a source’s story 
checks out, it should be printed.  When it turns out later that a source lied, 
printing a correction and then aggressively reporting on the lie itself corrects 
the initial error.  This method preserves confidentiality, avoids the chilling 
effect, and fully informs the public. 
Prime Minister Clark might have lied.  Even if she did, the follow-up 
stories and intense media scrutiny uncovered her role in the affair more 
                                                      
43
  Frontline: Interview Floyd Abrams, (PBS television broadcast July 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/abrams.html. 
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effectively, thoroughly, and responsibly than compelled disclosure would 
have—all while maintaining the free flow of information.44 
B. New Zealand’s Press Has an Established and Colorful History of 
Protecting Confidential Sources 
New Zealand has long enjoyed a healthy commitment to press 
freedoms, particularly the protection of confidential sources.  Media 
historians point to protection of anonymous authors and the difficulties faced 
by reporters in maintaining those confidences45 since the inception of New 
Zealand’s press in 1840.46 
In 1894, the Evening Post obtained leaked documents regarding the 
resignation of New Zealand’s military commander.  The paper ran the story 
prior to the government’s official announcement.47  Incensed, government 
officials established a royal commission to ferret out the leak’s source.  In 
response, the Evening Post’s editor, E.T. Gillon, called the commission a 
“gargantuan farce,” an “impudent travesty of justice,” and a “political 
fraud.”48  He refused to appear after being subpoenaed, calling the duty to 
maintain confidential sources “absolutely sacred.”49 
More than a century later, the instinct to protect confidential sources 
has largely endured.  These days, New Zealand consistently ranks among the 
most free and open societies in the world.  In 2007, the nonprofit media 
advocacy and support organization Reporters sans Frontières (a.k.a. 
Reporters Without Borders) ranked New Zealand 15th out of 169 nations.50  
This placement was higher than the United States (ranked 48th),51 Australia 
                                                      
44
  The Sunday Star-Times divulged Prime Minister Clark’s role in the affair, see List, supra note 18. 
45
  GUY SCHOLEFIELD, NEWSPAPERS IN NEW ZEALAND 4 (A. H. & A. W. Reed 1958). 
46
  PATRICK DAY, THE MAKING OF THE NEW ZEALAND PRESS 12 (Victoria University Press 1990).  In 
one case, the government sought disclosure of the identity of a scathing editorial’s author by ordering the 
registrar of the Supreme Court to obtain the original manuscript from the printer of the New Zealand 
Herald and Auckland Gazette.  See KARL DU FRESNE, THE RIGHT TO KNOW: NEWS MEDIA FREEDOM IN 
NEW ZEALAND 9 (Newspapers Publishers Association 2006).  When the printer handed over the 
manuscript, the editor of the paper challenged the registrar to a duel—an offer that was graciously rebuffed.  
Id. 
47
  DU FRESNE, supra note 46, at 11. 
48
 Id. 
49
  Id. 
50
  REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLDWIDE PRESS FREEDOM INDEX, 2007. 
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24025 (last visited Sept. 10, 2008). 
51
  Id.  A year earlier, Reporters Without Borders commented on the Bush Administration:  “The 
United States (53rd) has fallen nine places [in freedom-of-the-press rank] since last year, after being in 17th 
position in the first year of the Index, in 2002.  Relations between the media and the Bush administration 
sharply deteriorated after the president used the pretext of ‘national security’ to regard as suspicious any 
journalist who questioned his ‘war on terrorism.’  The zeal of federal courts which, unlike those in 33 US 
states, refuse to recognize the media’s right not to reveal its sources, even threatens journalists whose 
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(ranked 28th), and other democratic nations with long traditions of vibrant 
media.52  Moreover, in 2007, the nonprofit organization Freedom House 
ranked New Zealand’s press as “free,” its highest mark.53  Insiders agree 
with these assessments.  Karl du Fresne, author of The Right to Know: News 
Media Freedom in New Zealand, states, “In New Zealand, the news media 
enjoy a degree of freedom shared by few other countries.”54 
Some prescient observers, however, have recognized the need for 
vigilance.  Historically, press protections have been fragile rights easily 
slapped down by government or the courts.  As Du Fresne notes, press 
freedoms “can be eroded by inches and degrees” and “[f]reedoms that are 
taken for granted are freedoms at risk.”55   In 2006, Freedom House, in 
discussing New Zealand, cautioned that “although democratic traditions 
have been strengthened in recent years by reforms such as the Official 
Information Act and Bill of Rights Act, there are still concerns that these 
rights remain relatively fragile.”56 
In the realm of confidential sources, it is becoming “reasonably 
common” in New Zealand for litigants to seek disclosure from journalists to 
bolster evidentiary offerings. 57   More troubling than parties seeking 
information, however, has been the response of some courts.  “Numerous 
courts and tribunals have the power to compel production of documents and 
to issue subpoenae.  Many of them are exercising these powers in respect of 
journalists, and are doing so reasonably regularly.”58 
The increased willingness of courts to order the disclosure of 
confidential sources may help explain the passage of § 68, but it remains to 
be seen whether the new law will provide any additional protection. 
                                                                                                                                                              
investigations have no connection at all with terrorism.”  See REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLDWIDE 
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19388 (last visited Nov. 21, 
2008).  The United States ticked back up to 48th in 2007 due to the release of Josh Wolf, a freelance 
journalist and blogger who had been imprisoned for 224 days for refusing to turn over his outtakes.  
However, Sudanese cameraman Sami al-Haj, who works for the pan-Arab broadcaster Al-Jazeera, has been 
held without trial since June 2002 at the US military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  See REPORTERS 
WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 50.  The drastic drop in press freedoms during the Bush Administration’s 
“national security” fetish sends a clear message regarding the fragility of press freedoms. 
52
  REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 50. 
53
  FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 2007, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2007 (select New Zealand from the pull-
down menu) (last visited Sept. 10, 2008). 
54
  DU FRESNE, supra note 46, at 3. 
55
  Id. at 1. 
56
  FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 2006, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2006 (select New Zealand from the pull-
down menu) (last visited Sept. 10, 2008). 
57
  Gray, supra note 29, at 444. 
58
  Id. 
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III. ALTHOUGH § 68 CODIFIES NEW PROTECTIONS FOR JOURNALISTS AND 
THEIR SOURCES, IT CONTAINS SEVERAL SHORTCOMINGS 
The New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 (“Act”) draws common law and 
statutory authority into a single cohesive unit.59  Before passage of the Act, 
evidence law was largely the product of common law, “comprising decisions 
made by judges in response to the particular set of facts before the court.”60  
Parliament enacted only a few “piecemeal” statutory reforms as needed.61  
“The resulting complexity and inconsistency of the law of evidence 
result[ed] in undue legal argument, expense, and delays . . . ”62 
Section 68 is best understood as part of the Act’s “comprehensive 
scheme” of evidentiary rules.63  Until passage of the Act, New Zealand 
courts had not established a coherent policy for handling protection of 
journalists’ sources. 64   One commentator described New Zealand’s 
protections for confidential sources as follows:  “[t]here are a number of 
overlapping rules that might apply depending on the circumstances, but 
ultimately the discretion is with the court to compel disclosure or not.”65  
The Act, including § 68, sought to correct these ambiguities in the 
application of the law. 
Section 68 replaces common law principles with statutory rules, but 
reserves significant discretion for the judiciary.  So, while § 68 codifies a 
privilege for journalists and their sources, it also permits the same brand of 
judicial inconsistency the Act sought to correct. 
A. Section 68 Has Strengths That Aid the Free Flow of Information in 
New Zealand 
At first glance, § 68 seems a boon to reporters by presuming reporter-
source confidentiality.  This presumption makes nondisclosure the default 
position, from which the court can move only if the public interest so 
demands.  The statute’s opening salvo reads: 
                                                      
59
  Evidence Bill, 2005, H.R. Bill [256-1], Explanatory Note, General Policy Statement, at 1. 
60
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If a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the 
informant’s identity, neither the journalist nor his or her 
employer is compellable in a civil or criminal proceeding to 
answer any question or produce any document that would 
disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to 
be discovered.66 
This codification shifts the burden of proof from the reporters who, before, 
had to convince the court of the need for confidentiality, to the party seeking 
disclosure.67  On the surface, this burden-of-proof transfer has the potential 
to create sweeping reform in the area of reporter-source confidentiality.  The 
practical value of this shift, however, remains to be seen.  Courts often seem 
more amenable to arguments in favor of disclosure than arguments in favor 
of confidentiality. 
Section 68 also casts a fairly wide net.  Namely, the privilege applies 
not only to testimony, but also to production of documents that explicitly 
disclose the confidant or would “enable that identity to be discovered.”68  It 
would make little sense if the party seeking disclosure could simply use the 
reporter’s notes as a back-door method of acquiring the identity.69 
However, the wide net needs some minor repairs.  The operative terms 
in § 68(1), as excerpted above, are “would disclose” or “enable [the 
informant’s] identity to be discovered.”70  A court could find this language to 
be as narrow as, say, the informant’s name, date of birth, or other readily 
identifiable characteristic; on the other hand, the language could be broad 
enough to swallow any substantive information imparted to the journalist 
that a diligent person could use to ferret out the source’s identity.  Section 68 
sheds little light on whether the actual information imparted to the journalist 
is protected along with the identity.  The narrow construction seems 
particularly susceptible to abuse in whistleblower scenarios where only a 
handful of people have access to the disclosed information.  If that type of 
substantive information is admitted into evidence, the privilege will not 
operate effectively. 
Accordingly, § 68(1)’s terminology should be more precisely defined, 
preferably enumerating all types of journalistic work product (e.g. notes, 
outtakes, recordings, and so on) that could be used to identify a source.  
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Without more, the court could narrowly define the reporter-source privilege, 
making it a privilege in name only. 
B. Section 68 Contains Flaws That Undermine the Intent, Application, 
and Purpose of the Privilege 
Section 68 has not yet been tested by the New Zealand courts.  In that 
light, the court of first impression should keep in mind three broad 
categories in which § 68 is deficient:  1) it is inconsistent with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; 2) § 68 circumscribes common law 
protections; and 3) it has not kept pace with the general environment of press 
protections New Zealanders enjoy.  The qualified privilege created by § 68 
at best improves incrementally on the status quo and, at worst, functions to 
impair common law and existing statutory protections.  Despite the new 
presumption of nondisclosure, in many ways § 68 is also weaker than the 
prior privilege regime. 
1. Section 68’s Imprecision Sabotages Iron-Clad Protection, Leaving the 
Confidentiality of Journalists’ Sources at the Court’s Discretion 
The overarching weakness of § 68 is its malleability.  The 
presumption of confidentiality afforded in § 68(1) is all but gutted in the 
very next breath.  Section 68(2) creates a balancing test that gives the 
presiding judge wide latitude to overcome the presumption: 
A Judge of the High Court may order that subsection (1) is not 
to apply if satisfied by a party to a civil or criminal proceeding 
that, having regard to the issues to be determined in that 
proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of evidence of 
the identity of the informant outweighs— 
(a) any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the 
informant or any other person; and 
(b) the public interest in the communication of facts and 
opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also, 
in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts.71 
By couching the balancing test in broad language without effective fail-safes 
placed upon the judiciary, Parliament may have made it less challenging for 
judges to order disclosure than at common law.  This circumstance exists 
because the Evidence Act 2006, in which § 68 is codified, expressly 
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supersedes the common law.  “The Act reflects current developments in 
evidence law and takes into account fundamental changes in some areas,” 
said Justice Minister Mark Burton.72  “It also clarifies the existing law by 
removing ambiguities and inconsistencies.” 73   When § 68 is eventually 
tested, the party seeking disclosure will undoubtedly argue that the law 
tosses out the old common law protections in favor of the codified and 
imprecise balancing test. 
Parliament undoubtedly saw § 68’s balancing test as an asset to the 
administration of justice.  The courts themselves have long expressed an 
interest in not being “tied hand and foot” by rigid, forced adherence to press 
freedoms.74 
It is a point well taken.  Journalists should not have an absolute 
privilege in all circumstances.  Common sense dictates the need for some 
limits on free press.  In an example birthed by the modern terrorism 
environment, if a journalist is truly the only outlet that has information 
imperative to preventing imminent harm, a court should be able to compel 
disclosure of that information.  Accordingly, a balancing test makes good 
sense.  By definition, balancing tests must have some room to stretch to meet 
the circumstances of each case.  However, they should not permit a degree 
of elasticity that provides room for judges to uphold subpoenas for source 
identifying information when free expression in free society dictates that 
confidentiality should stand. 
Experience with Section 35 of New Zealand’s Evidence Amendment 
Act (No. 2) 198075 (“§ 35”) illustrates some problems that can arise from 
open-ended balancing tests in the context of confidential sources.  The thrust 
and language of § 68 is strikingly similar—and indeed may have been 
largely inspired by—§ 35.  Section 35 creates a balancing test providing 
judges with general discretion to excuse any witness from answering 
questions or producing documents that would constitute a breach of 
confidence.76 
Section 35 does not mention journalists specifically, although it 
squarely implicates their line of work.  Subsection (2) requires the court to 
“consider whether or not the public interest in having the evidence disclosed 
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to the Court is outweighed, in the particular case, by the public interest in the 
preservation of confidences between persons . . . .”77  Furthermore, the court 
must consider specific factors when balancing the arguments, such as:  “(a) 
The likely significance of the evidence to the resolution of the issues to be 
decided in the proceeding:  (b) The nature of the confidence and the special 
relationship between the confidant and the witness:  (c) The likely effect of 
the disclosure on the confidant or any other person.”78  As one New Zealand 
media law textbook notes, “[i]t is clear that the power to excuse the witness 
[under § 35] is discretionary,” and that power is used only “occasionally” by 
the courts.79 
In fact, the balancing test in § 35 was recently exploited in the New 
Zealand case R v. Patel.80  In this case, Keith Slater, a television reporter for 
TV3’s program 60 Minutes, briefly interviewed an anonymous police 
informer concerning the murder-for-hire orchestrated by defendant 
Bhikubhai Patel. 81   Patel subpoenaed Slater to disclose the interview 
contents and the identification of the source.  The court, after applying the 
balancing test set forth in § 35, in addition to the commitment to free flow of 
information inherent to Section 14 of New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(“§ 14”),82 dismissed Slater’s motion to quash the subpoena.83  Suddenly 
facing a live subpoena, Slater faced contempt of court if he did not divulge 
his source. 
In making its decision, the Patel court eviscerated the simple 
balancing test in § 35—a test which, again, closely resembles § 68.  Justice 
Cooper wrote, “[i]n my view, having regard to the nature of the defence, the 
inevitable conclusion is that Mr Slater’s evidence is likely to be highly 
significant to the resolution of issues concerning [the informant’s] 
credibility, which is plainly a matter to be addressed under s 35(2)(a) of the 
Act.”84  With this sentence, the court dispatched the public’s interest in free 
expression.  In fact, the “inevitability” envisioned by Justice Cooper 
conflicts with the rights embedded in § 14, § 35, and New Zealand’s 
common law commitment to press protections. 
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The court offered further ruminations regarding journalists’ ability to 
maintain confidentiality when interviewing sources, including this troubling 
conundrum: 
In a situation where the person providing the information is a 
key witness in a prosecution and will of necessity have to give 
evidence in a public trial, it could not properly be assumed 
either by the witness or the reporter that the content of their 
discussions would be able to be kept private.85 
This appears to establish, at least in Justice Cooper’s courtroom, that when a 
reporter talks to a “key witness” before that witness testifies, the 
confidentiality of that conversation cannot be preserved.  Because Justice 
Cooper applied the balancing test in § 35 to arrive at this decision, the 
precedent does not bode well for journalists who rely on the similar 
balancing test codified in § 68. 
The Patel case exemplifies the need for more robust protections in 
New Zealand’s reporter shield law.  If Parliament does not reinforce § 68, it 
will offer few protections beyond those dismissed by the Patel court under  
§ 35.  Applying today’s journalists’ privilege, New Zealand courts could 
easily reach the same result as the Patel court, with only the added hurdle of 
inserting a sentence in the opinion that overcomes § 68’s presumption of 
nondisclosure.  As Patel demonstrates, judges applying § 68’s balancing test 
could prioritize the “public interest” in full evidentiary disclosure at the 
expense of source confidentiality and freedom of the press. 
Proponents of the balancing test cite another recent case, R v. Cara & 
Kelman,86 as evidence that such tests protect rather than undermine free 
speech.  In Cara, one of two defendants accused of being an Israeli spy 
sought information published by journalists to aid his defense.87  The Cara 
court excused three journalists for the New Zealand Herald from giving 
evidence, sought under a subpoena, regarding confidential sources.88 
The Cara opinion, however, stands as a hollow victory for 
confidential source protection.  Although the court ultimately did not compel 
disclosure under § 14 and § 35, the decision turned on the fact that the 
evidence was deemed irrelevant to the case, not because free press trumped 
fair trial in a head-to-head confrontation.  The court ruled that the party 
seeking disclosure was merely engaged in a fishing expedition, “[n]or is the 
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evidence sought directly relevant to the central issue of whether or not the 
accused can receive a fair trial.”89  If the information were indeed relevant, 
and the court nevertheless held that free press trumped fair trial, then the 
ruling would help solidify the importance of journalistic privilege under  
§ 35’s balancing test.  The Cara court merely sidestepped the conflict by 
holding the sought evidence irrelevant. 
2. Section 68 Is Inconsistent with the Common Law Necessity 
Requirement, and Neglects to Codify Important Protections Under It 
An understanding of New Zealand’s common law as it pertains to § 68 
requires a discussion of English common law, from which New Zealand’s 
common law derives.  New Zealand courts apply English precedent unless 
New Zealand courts have distinguished the particular legal issue.  Even in 
the case of distinguished law, the English common law still carries 
persuasive authority.90  New Zealand courts look beyond England, as well, 
for persuasive authority.  One legal scholar has noted that “New Zealand 
courts will consider authorities from a variety of other common law 
jurisdictions, especially Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the 
USA.”91 
English common law courts often required a showing of “necessity” 
before ordering disclosure of confidential sources or placing restrictions on 
the press.  Although the “necessity” threshold has waxed and waned over 
time, its protection was consistently greater than that provided for by § 68, 
which has no such requirement.  English courts seem comfortable with a 
flexible “degree of need”92 to compel disclosure.  One judge93 wrote:  “I 
doubt if it is possible to go further than to say that ‘necessary’ has a meaning 
that lies somewhere between ‘indispensable’ on the one hand, and ‘useful’ or 
‘expedient’ on the other. . . .  The nearest paraphrase I can suggest is ‘really 
needed.’”94 
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Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights, in The Sunday Times 
v. United Kingdom (No. 2), the famous Spycatcher case, held that necessity 
“implies the existence of a pressing social need.”95  The Spycatcher cases 
revolved around a tell-all book of the same title, written by a former British 
spy.  The book chronicled MI5’s attempt to discover a Soviet mole.  Citing 
national security concerns, the British government sought to gag newspapers 
from running excerpts of the book, but the newspapers prevailed.  Even in 
the national security context, the government had not met its burden of proof 
on a showing of necessity.  These cases illustrate that while the necessity 
scale is flexible, it by definition remains within the boundaries of 
protectiveness. 
In the New Zealand case Cara, supra, the court used its discretion 
under § 35 to implement something very similar to a necessity test.96  The 
court excluded the evidence because it was “not relevant or essential”97 to 
fair trial concerns.  However, the court was not guided in that direction by 
forceful legislation; it found the evidence unnecessary at its own discretion 
and under the impetus of common law. 
Under the English common law, a finding of “necessity” was in part a 
function of whether the party seeking disclosure had exhausted other means 
of obtaining the information before approaching journalists.  Often, the 
failure to seek other sources of the information could be “a powerful, even a 
decisive, factor against the intervention of the court.”98  The necessity test 
required parties to exhaust other means of obtaining the desired information 
before disclosure was contemplated, resulting in limited and appropriate 
instances of compelled disclosure. 
The exhaustion requirement is a sensible protection that has relatively 
little impact on the administration of justice, yet delivers huge windfalls for 
free expression.  Other jurisdictions have embraced this exhaust-other-
avenues approach.  Guidelines established by the United States Department 
of Justice, for example, require prosecutors to exhaust reasonable means 
before issuing subpoenas to reporters.99  English courts agree.  In Ashworth 
Hospital Authority v. MGN Ltd., the court held that “in order to demonstrate 
that disclosure of a source is necessary, a claimant must show that all other 
reasonable means have been employed unsuccessfully to identify the 
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source.”100  The case Attorney-General v. Mulholland states explicitly that 
“if the information can be obtained elsewhere, it is not relevant or necessary 
for [the journalist] to furnish it.”101 
While Ashworth and Mulholland speak in firm tones about the need to 
exhaust other sources, the leading case from the English judiciary on 
journalistic source protection, Saunders v. Punch Ltd., backs off the 
requirement:  “I do not say that the making of such attempts is a necessary 
precondition of the court’s assistance . . . .”102 
Section 68, in contrast, remains silent on the need to exhaust.  This 
deficiency potentially permits parties to engage in so-called fishing 
expeditions without first attempting to acquire the information from non-
media sources.  However, a court could find an exhaustion requirement 
implicitly exists in the catchall language of § 68(3):  “[t]he Judge may make 
the order subject to any terms and conditions that the Judge thinks 
appropriate.”103  Whether judges will insert an exhaustion requirement into  
§ 68(3) remains to be seen. 
New Zealand courts might follow the Cara precedent, which birthed 
something similar to a necessity requirement from the balancing test in § 35.  
The same requirement could be read into § 68’s balancing test.  The waters 
in this pool are very murky, though, and in the end, journalists seeking to 
quash subpoenas will find themselves at the court’s discretion regarding an 
exhaustion requirement.  At worst, a court could find that the necessity to 
seek information from a non-journalist source will not apply, as it is not 
expressly enumerated in § 68.  After all, the drafters had the opportunity to 
include an exhaustion requirement, but chose not to. 
3. Section 68 Does Not Meet the Mandate for Free Expression Found in 
§ 14 of New Zealand’s BORA 
Similar to England, New Zealand does not have a formal written 
constitution.104  Instead, its constitutional authority is formed through an 
amalgam of statutes, treaties, court decisions, and other authority.105  The 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“BORA”), which spells out the 
fundamental rights and freedoms enjoyed by New Zealanders, is one of the 
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documents afforded constitutional stature.  Section 14 of BORA addresses 
the free flow of information in society and freedom of the press.  It states 
simply:  “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the 
right to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in 
any form.”106 
Section 14 is a powerful legal tool for people working in the news 
business.  According to one legal scholar and practitioner: 
Perhaps the most significant legal change in the last two and a 
half decades has been the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990.  Section 14 of the Bill of Rights has provided 
a new focus for arguments based on freedom of expression, and 
has allowed the media to be more assertive, and more 
successful, in pressing claims to freedom of expression in the 
courts . . . .  [P]rior to the 1990s the media did not tend to talk 
of a ‘right’ to freedom of speech or expression.  Now the courts 
are required by statute to act consistently with the right to 
freedom of expression.107 
As noted in section II.A, supra, the journalistic necessity of cultivating, 
utilizing, and maintaining confidential sources is imperative to the free flow 
of information.  Confidential sources fit within the phrase “information and 
opinions of any kind in any form.”108  Accordingly, because § 68 does not 
offer robust protections to confidential sources, it is arguably inconsistent 
with New Zealand’s BORA.  By allowing such wide judicial discretion, § 68 
could be construed as failing the guaranteed “right to freedom of expression” 
in BORA’s § 14.  The shield law should be strengthened to comply with the 
broadest interpretation of BORA’s mandate. 
From a policy standpoint, the weakness of § 68 also opens the door to 
a chilling effect.  This reality is inconsistent with § 14’s purpose.  To enforce 
§ 14’s ideals, the language of § 68 should be read broadly to promote the 
relationships between reporters and their sources.  The right to “receive” 
information, under BORA, should demand nothing less. 
Section 25 of BORA establishes robust rights for the accused.  
Criminal prosecutions are an area where the confidentiality of sources is 
often challenged.  Rights of the accused are spelled out in BORA under 
Section 25 (“§ 25”).109  Section 14 and § 25 butt heads, almost by definition, 
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in matters where a party seeks disclosure of a confidential source.  In most 
cases, only one principle, either free press or fair trial will survive, not both.  
As the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognized in Gisborne Herald Co. 
Ltd. v. Solicitor-General, “[b]oth values have been affirmed by the Bill of 
Rights. . . .  Full recognition of both these indispensable elements can 
present difficult problems for the Courts to resolve.”110 
Despite the equal footing afforded these “indispensable elements,” 
judges often use fair-trial justifications to overcome § 14 (and § 35) 
arguments.  Courts have consistently ruled that free press issues must yield 
to fair trial concerns, although BORA makes no hierarchical determination 
and certainly does not demand this result.111  A New Zealand scholar noted, 
“once it is established that there is a real risk of prejudice to a fair trial, 
freedom of expression must be curtailed.”112 
Section 25’s dominance seems rooted in the logic of Wigmore’s 
enduring—and apparently unshakable—adage that “the public . . . has a 
right to every man’s evidence.”113   In free nations, those facing loss of 
liberty typically have the right to present an effective defense.  But in New 
Zealand, that right is not absolute.  It must be balanced against the equally 
important right of “[f]reedom of the press as a vehicle for comment on 
public issues . . .”114 as Gisborne indicates.  More recently, the Cara court 
stated that “the Court is here balancing two rights affirmed by the Bill of 
Rights which in the circumstances of this case are in competition, the one 
with the other, to which the Court must seek a response that is proportionate 
and justifiable.”115 
4. Section 68 Invites Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial 
Interests 
In the future, § 68 will likely face the same withering attacks as § 14.  
This eventuality is assured by express language in the definition subsection, 
§ 68(5):  “public interest in the disclosure of evidence includes, in a criminal 
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proceeding, the defendant’s right to present an effective defence.”116  This 
language shoots holes in many arguments journalists could hope to muster 
against criminal defendants’ right to a fair trial.  This is one of the few issues 
the drafters choose to address with great specificity—and for good reason.  
The rights protected by § 25 should not be automatically dislocated by New 
Zealand’s shield law.  The qualified journalists’ privilege must permit some 
room for disclosure when justice truly demands. 
The bad news for free press is that almost by definition the triers of 
fact have more concrete experience with the court system than the media.  
Judges have, in a very real sense, devoted their lives to the administration of 
justice and an efficient, well-ordered court process.  In that vein, when 
balancing the “indispensable elements,” judges readily understand the 
impact of excluding testimony and evidence when excusing a journalist from 
testifying.  However, the impact on society for disclosure of confidential 
sources is far less intuitive and comprehensible.  The New Zealand Law 
Commission has recognized that freedom of expression often faces a judicial 
handicap: 
These potential harms to society are not easy to evaluate in 
themselves, let alone to balance against the potential harm 
which may be done to the administration of justice if significant 
information is not disclosed.  Nor can they be readily 
demonstrated in a courtroom setting.  Judges who administer 
justice every day may perhaps be more conscious of costs for 
the legal system than broader social costs.117 
The damage done to fair trials by maintaining confidential sources is often 
overstated and, conversely, the importance of protecting free press interests 
is often underestimated.  “[P]ublic costs of nondisclosure in terms of lost 
information, evidence, opportunities to suppress or punish wrongdoing are 
often relatively minimal or illusory,” 118  writes one media law scholar.  
“[T]he public interest in protecting [confidential] sources should nearly 
always prevail and giving priority to any other public interest should never 
be automatic.” 119   A prominent New Zealand media law scholar stated 
recently, “[g]iven the statutory protection of freedom of expression in [§ 14] 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, it needs to be considered 
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whether, on some occasions, the public interest in discussing an issue should 
prevail over the right to a fair trial.”120 
While courts should be sensitive to both these competing rights, they 
should not so readily dismiss free-press concerns.  In fact, the tension at 
issue might be more accurately framed not as a conflict between free press 
and fair trial, but rather a conflict between fair trial and the public’s right to 
know.  The distinction is subtle, but revolutionary.  After all, media outlets 
fulfill their purpose by supplying information to their audience.  The press 
does not challenge compulsion subpoenas entirely for its own satisfaction; 
instead, the press fights to retain confidentiality for the interest of public 
access to information.  If viewed through these glasses (i.e., the press is an 
extension of the public at large) judges might be more willing to maintain 
confidences. 
5. Section 68 Does Not Adequately Protect Freedom of Information 
Almost fifteen years ago, the New Zealand Law Commission 121 
authored a paper weighing the practicality of certain privileges, including a 
journalists’ privilege.122  The Commission ultimately found that § 35 did not, 
by itself, sufficiently protect journalists.  “Although . . . the legislature 
appear[s] to have had journalists in mind when [§ 35] was adopted, the 
protection which § 35 offers is no longer adequate.”123  Accordingly, the 
Commission recommended modifying § 35 to include protections equivalent 
to a qualified journalists’ privilege.124  The proposals contained safeguards to 
ensure the untrammeled free flow of information. 125   “With these 
amendments. . . a provision equivalent to § 35 in the proposed evidence code 
would adequately protect journalists’ sources from compulsory 
disclosure.”126  However, § 68’s drafters seem to have ignored many of the 
amendments suggested by the Commission, favoring instead the naked 
balancing test from § 35.  The inference, then, is that without the safeguards, 
the Law Commission considers § 68’s current balancing test inadequate.  
The following two pitfalls are of particular concern. 
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First, by creating a blanket balancing test, § 68 fails to “take into 
account the nature of the proceeding, such as whether it is criminal or 
civil.” 127   Lumping both civil and criminal proceedings under the same 
standard shows a troubling and fundamental misunderstanding of the rights 
at play.  By failing to differentiate between criminal and civil matters, § 68 
implies that the same standard applies to both proceedings.  However, the 
qualified journalists’ privilege should be bifurcated, with separate standards 
for civil and criminal matters. 
The evidentiary standard in criminal proceedings is more rigorous 
than in civil matters.  In most cases, New Zealand criminal defendants must 
be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, while the standard in civil cases 
is typically lower, often more likely than not.128  This division recognizes 
that personal liberty in a criminal proceeding is of a different quality than 
liability in a civil proceeding. 
The opposite should be true for compelled disclosure.  While § 68 
could be strengthened in general, compelled disclosure in civil matters 
where life, liberty, and the public welfare are not at risk should be especially 
difficult to obtain.  The value to society of protecting the free flow of 
information is almost always more important than the particular issues 
litigated in civil matters.  Criminal matters, however, are more problematic.  
The source’s identity should still be appropriately protected, but some 
concessions should be made for imminent and dire threats to public or 
personal safety. 
A single standard cannot be appropriate for both proceedings.  The 
flexibility of § 68, of course, permits judges to apply different standards to 
different proceedings, but it also allows them to abuse that flexibility. 
Second, the Law Commission’s paper recommended requiring a less-
intrusive method for acquiring the sought-after identity, stating, “alternative 
avenues should be exhausted before ordering a journalist to disclose.”129  
Section 68 contains no such requirement.  Although § 68(3) states that a 
judge can make the disclosure subject to “any terms and conditions that the 
Judge thinks appropriate,” it does not mandate using a less-intrusive method 
where possible.  The less-intrusive method guarantees that parties seeking 
disclosure do not use court proceedings merely as fishing expeditions or as 
expeditious means of acquiring informants’ identities. 
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In addition to § 68’s omission of the Law Commission’s 
recommended amendments, a few notable ambiguities in § 68 create 
considerable concern.  First, it is unclear whether § 68 applies outside the 
scope of a “civil or criminal proceeding,” 130  including agency hearings, 
military courts and, most importantly, tribunals such as the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority (“BSA”).  The BSA, an independent crown entity, 
operates a “quasi-judicial role of determining complaints” 131  regarding 
media broadcasting.  Tribunals such as the BSA “hear evidence; their 
determinations often affect the rights of the parties before them; [and] they 
frequently decide something in the nature of a legal dispute between 
parties.”132  Accordingly, § 68’s lack of specificity on this issue could, at 
best, create considerable uncertainty regarding the use of a journalists’ 
privilege in certain trial-like settings and, at worst, preclude its protections. 
Second, a court will have to determine who falls under the auspices of 
§ 68.  The statute declares, “neither the journalist nor his or her employer is 
compellable”133 to disclose an informant’s identity.  Section 68(5) describes 
a journalist as one who “may be given information by an informant.”134  A 
narrow reading of this language might preclude, for example, television 
news producers and newspaper copy editors.  Moreover, § 68 applies only to 
those who receive confidences in the “normal course of that person’s 
work.”135  A court could determine that bloggers, freelance journalists, or 
book authors who only occasionally foray down investigative avenues 
should not be afforded § 68’s protections.  The threshold question becomes 
textual in nature:  What is the meaning of “work?”  One judge might 
determine that, say, unpaid bloggers are “working,” while another might rule 
that unpaid bloggers are merely engaging in a hobby.  The ambiguity in this 
portion of § 68(5) is especially troubling in light of the ease and speed with 
which technology creates new mediums for the transmission of information. 
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IV. NEW ZEALAND SHOULD LOOK TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS FOR 
GUIDANCE, INCLUDING U.S. FEDERAL LAW AND WASHINGTON STATE’S 
SHIELD LAW 
New Zealand does not have to start from scratch in order to 
reasonably strengthen § 68.  Two existing sources to which Parliament 
should look for guidance include United States federal law and the newly 
enacted shield law in Washington State.  New Zealand would be well served 
by observing not only the protective advantages of the two models, but also 
their shortcomings.  The state of the U.S. journalists’ privilege should serve 
as a cautionary tale for New Zealand legislators, while Washington State’s 
law models the appropriate level of protection, codified with assertive, 
informative, and unambiguous fail-safes on the courts. 
A. The U.S. Congress Has Not Enacted a Federal Reporter Shield Law, 
Leaving the Circuit Courts in Disagreement Regarding the 
Boundaries of the Federal Reporter-Source Privilege  
The United States lacks a statutory federal journalists’ privilege to 
protect against compelled disclosure of confidential sources.  Despite 
numerous proposed bills, Congress has not passed a shield law.136 
From a judicial perspective, in Branzburg v. Hayes a five-member 
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a privilege permitting 
journalists to conceal confidential sources in a grand jury context.137  Justice 
Powell’s “decisive concurrence,” 138  though, “called for a case-by-case 
balancing that takes into account press and law enforcement interests.”139  In 
light of Justice Powell’s concurrence, some federal circuit courts have read 
the majority opinion’s language very narrowly, finding breathing room for a 
balancing test outside the grand jury context. 
For example, in the 1981 case Zerilli v. Smith,140 the D.C. Circuit 
found that “in the ordinary case the civil litigant’s interest in disclosure 
should yield to the journalist’s privilege.”141  The Zerilli court also held that 
“a qualified privilege would be available in some circumstances even where 
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a reporter is called before a grand jury to testify.”142  However, in the 2003 
case McKevitt v. Pallasch, 143  the Seventh Circuit reverted back to the 
narrower majority viewpoint in Branzburg, declaring that journalists relying 
on a privilege “may be skating on thin ice.”144  The chaos among the circuits 
is not limited to Zerilli and McKevitt.  The spectrum of protection fluctuates 
wildly, from relatively high in the Second and Ninth Circuits to completely 
unprotective in the Sixth Circuit.145 
The Branzburg decision has led to a degree of uncertainty and lack of 
uniformity among the circuit courts.  New Zealand risks a similar confusion 
with the vague balancing test of § 68.  The language of § 68, as it now 
stands, permits New Zealand courts in various jurisdictions to establish 
disparate precedents. 
In an attempt to offer some coherence to the reporter-source privilege, 
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) established internal guidelines 
directing that “the prosecutorial power of the government should not be used 
in such a way that it impairs a reporter’s responsibility to cover as broadly as 
possible controversial public issues.”146  One commentator has remarked that 
the guidelines “arguably serve as a shadow federal shield law.”147  In fact, 
the DOJ guidelines provide for a balancing test very similar to New 
Zealand’s § 68.  Subsection (a) reads: 
In determining whether to request issuance of a subpoena to a 
member of the news media, or for telephone toll records of any 
member of the news media, the approach in every case must be 
to strike the proper balance between the public’s interest in the 
free dissemination of ideas and information and the public's 
interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration 
of justice.148 
Recently, though, these protections failed to protect reporters Judith Miller 
and Matt Cooper from being held in contempt of court for refusing to reveal 
the identity of a source.149  As former U.S. Solicitor General Ted Olson has 
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noted, “the Justice Department has had internal standards providing 
protection to journalists and their sources for 35 years, and Special Counsel 
Patrick J. Fitzgerald claimed to be adhering to those standards when he 
subpoenaed reporters in the Plame affair.”150 
Miller, in particular, felt the pain of reporting in an environment that 
has no strong protections for the free flow of information.  She spent 85 days 
behind bars for conversations she had with top Bush Administration 
officials, most notably I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, regarding the identity of 
CIA covert operative Valerie Plame.151  Miller was released only when Libby 
authorized her to disclose his identity.152  Miller later testified before the 
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, citing an “urgent need” for a federal 
reporter shield law.153 
The federal status quo should serve as a caution signal to New 
Zealand lawmakers.  Journalists should not go to jail for informing the 
public of matters important to democratic governance.  The Miller fiasco is 
relevant because the DOJ guidelines are more stringent than § 68, including 
requiring reasonable attempts to locate the informant before haling the 
journalist into court,154 mandating attempts at negotiations before seeking a 
subpoena,155 getting express authorization of the U.S. attorney general,156 
and others.  Still, they still did not protect Miller from serving jail time. 
B. Washington State’s Shield Law Strikes an Appropriate Balance 
Between the Public’s Competing Interests in Disclosure and 
Confidentiality 
In the absence of a coherent federal shield law in the United States, 
almost every state has recognized the need for a journalists’ privilege.  
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Thirty-two states now have codified shield statutes;157 another seventeen 
have some level of common law protections.158 
One of the most recent state shield laws is also one of the strongest.  
The Washington State shield law is an example of a forceful, effective 
privilege that harmonizes the public’s interest in confidentiality and the 
public’s interest in disclosure.  In the wake of the Judith Miller fiasco, 
Washington Attorney General Rob McKenna felt compelled to prevent a 
similar chain of events at the state level.159 
Washington’s shield law,160  which went into effect July 22, 2007, 
creates an absolute privilege against compelled disclosure of the identity of 
confidential sources. 161   Whether the privilege is invoked in a civil or 
criminal proceeding, journalists are never required to turn over the “identity 
of a source of any news or information or any information that would tend to 
identify the source” in Washington State. 162   This clause helps rank the 
Washington law among the most protective shields in the nation.163 
The statute also creates a qualified privilege for notes and other 
outtakes. 164   While not an absolute privilege, the qualified privilege 
recognizes that evidence and other information needs to be disclosed only in 
situations of compelling public interest.165 
Washington’s shield law has all the grit that New Zealand’s § 68 lacks.  
It provides standards that guide courts down an established and well-tended 
path, allowing for consistent enforcement.  Namely, it establishes standards 
that recognize the free flow of information in Washington.  For example, on 
a micro level, the disclosure of information must be “highly material and 
relevant” 166  and “critical or necessary” 167  to the party’s claim before 
compelled disclosure is even contemplated.  On a macro level, a 
“compelling public interest”168 must exist in the disclosure.  Furthermore, 
the party seeking disclosure must have “exhausted all reasonable and 
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available means” before subpoenaing journalists.169  Importantly, the law 
also has expansive definitions of news media170  and does not require a 
formalized promise between source and reporter; a “reasonable expectation 
of confidentiality” is enough.171 
The first test of Washington’s shield law was an apparent victory for 
the protection of confidential sources.  On November 28, 2007, Seattle City 
Attorney Tom Carr subpoenaed three Seattle Times reporters to turn over the 
identity of a source that had given the reporters information about a former 
Seattle police officer.172  The officer, John Powers, sued the Seattle Police 
Department for wrongful termination and defamation following an alleged 
brutality incident.  Carr, in defending the city, sought the subpoenas to 
discover what information the journalists could furnish.173 
Carr, who may have been unaware of the shield, withdrew the request 
outright after the Seattle Times’ attorneys filed a document explaining the 
steep hill Carr had to climb to get the sources.174  In the court brief, which 
supported the motion for a protective order against the subpoenas, the 
Seattle Times argued that “the new shield law flatly bars any order 
compelling disclosure of information relating to the identity of a confidential 
source, for which there is an absolute privilege.”175  The brief went on to 
argue that for any “other news and information” the Seattle City Attorney 
failed to meet the high bar.176  Namely, the subpoenas failed to persuade that 
the sought-after material was “highly material and relevant to its defense;”177 
that the reporters’ testimony was “critical or necessary;” 178  that the city 
“exhausted all reasonable and available means to obtain testimony from 
alternative sources;”179 and that no “compelling [public] interest in forcing 
non-party reporters to divulge their sources” existed.180 
The shield law’s author, attorney Bruce E.H. Johnson of Davis Wright 
Tremaine, explained as follows:  In Washington, reporters “really do have 
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the ability to promise confidentiality, as opposed to only promising 
confidentiality until they get tired of sitting in prison.”181 
V. PARLIAMENT SHOULD TOUGHEN § 68 OF THE NEW ZEALAND EVIDENCE 
ACT 2006 TO BETTER PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES 
 New Zealand’s Parliament should tighten § 68 to hem in the 
discretion of the nation’s courts.  Stronger protections would give the shield 
law the backbone necessary to ward off a chilling effect and comfort 
confidential sources.  Otherwise, § 68 will all but maintain the status quo of 
New Zealand’s no “coherent policy,”182  allowing courts to perform very 
much the same nebulous analysis as before.  Four suggestions follow: 
First, the term “outweighs,” in § 68(2), requires a mere preponderance 
of public interest in disclosure to justify compelling journalists to reveal 
their sources.183  Said another way, if the judge feels the scales tip ever so 
slightly in favor of disclosure (say, fifty-one percent) then the judge should, 
by statute, order the disclosure.  If Parliament enforced a standard of 
compelling public interest in the disclosure, instead of merely “outweighs,” 
courts would have less opportunity to compel disclosure.  The standard of 
compelling public interest would be more in line with New Zealand’s 
historical commitment to media freedoms and the language in BORA.  The 
term “outweighs” permits wide latitude for judges to compel disclosure. 
Second, the party seeking compulsion should have to prove the 
interest in disclosure by clear and convincing evidence.  As it stands now 
under § 68, the judge need only be “satisfied” in the disclosure.184  New 
Zealand courts have long recognized the clear and convincing standard in 
the realm of prior restraints, which are also under the purview of BORA’s  
§ 14.185  Why not create consistency by recognizing the same standard for 
confidential source protection?  The clear and convincing standard, which 
has been embraced by Washington State in its shield law, would set the bar 
high enough to guarantee that parties would not routinely seek subpoenas 
without good cause. 
Third, § 68 should ensure that the disclosure be highly material and 
relevant.  This language would preclude most fishing expeditions.  The Patel 
case serves a cautionary tale of the types of information that can be 
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compelled under § 68’s lax standard.  The court ultimately compelled 
disclosure in that case to prove the character of a witness, arguably 
stretching its discretion.  The character of a witness typically would not meet 
the standard of highly material and relevant, and it certainly should not be 
good enough reason to risk a chilling effect on the free flow of information. 
Fourth, by forcing journalists to expressly promise confidentiality in 
their conversations with sources, § 68(1) sets a very high threshold.186  In 
New Zealand, the shield will not apply without a formal promise.  However, 
reporters and their sources rarely communicate in such legalistic formalities.  
Particularly regarding sensitive issues, the parties may communicate via 
innuendo, inference, and body signals that, while unmistakable in context, 
might not satisfy the legal criterion in § 68(1).  As an illustration, it does not 
appear that Prime Minister Clark and the Sunday Star-Times established the 
requisite promise.  Despite Prime Minister Clark’s belief that she was 
communicating confidentially, 187  her identity and conversations with the 
journalist would almost certainly have to be admitted into evidence as the 
reporter-source confidentiality was not formally guaranteed.  Additionally, 
New Zealand contract law already offers a remedy for breach of confidence 
when formal promises are in play, making the requirement of a formal 
promise superfluous.  As one celebrated New Zealand media law scholar has 
noted, “[o]ne class of case gives rise to no problem:  where two parties are in 
a contractual relationship and expressly agree that information supplied by 
the one to the other is to be treated as confidential, that contractual 
undertaking can be enforced by all the ordinary contractual remedies.”188  
Upgrading the law to include merely a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality, as recognized in Washington State, would offer a sensible 
level of protection.  The formality of an express promise is inconsistent with 
strong press freedoms and encourages a chilling effect on cooperation with 
the press. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By inserting § 68 into its Evidence Act 2006, New Zealand made a 
laudable first attempt at protecting reporter-source confidentiality and, by 
extension, the public’s right to know.  The presumption of nondisclosure 
codified in the statute takes an assertive step toward promoting the free flow 
of information.  However, § 68 falls short in other regards.  Although the 
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shield law creates a presumption of nondisclosure, it is a presumption too 
easily overcome.  To come into line with New Zealand’s statutory 
framework, its long-standing commitment to press freedoms, and to promote 
the free flow of information, § 68 should be fortified with models from other 
democratic jurisdictions. 
